A framework for evaluating flood risk governance by Alexander, M et al.
This is an author produced version of A framework for evaluating flood risk governance.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/108070/
Article:
Alexander, M orcid.org/0000-0003-3147-085X, Priest, S and Mees, H (2016) A framework 
for evaluating flood risk governance. Environmental Science & Policy, 64. C. pp. 38-47. 
ISSN 1462-9011 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2016.06.004
© 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
 A framework for evaluating flood risk governance 
 
Meghan Alexandera, Sally Priesta and Hannelore Meesb  
 
  
 
a Flood Hazard Research Centre, Middlesex University 
The Burroughs, Hendon, London, NW4 4BT, UK 
Email: m.c.alexander@mdx.ac.uk (corresponding author)  
Email: s.priest@mdx.ac.uk  
 
& 
 
b Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Antwerp 
Sint-Jacobstraat 2, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium 
Email: hannelore.mees@uantwerpen.be   
 
 
 
 
This is the post-peer reviewed version of the following article: Alexander, M., Priest, S. and Mees, 
H. (In press, 2016) A framework for evaluating flood risk governance. Environmental Science and Policy.  
  
 A framework for evaluating flood risk governance  
 
 
Abstract  
Calls to strengthen flood risk governance are echoed across Europe amidst a growing 
consensus that floods will increase in the future. Accompanying the pursuit of societal 
resilience, other normative agendas relating legitimacy (e.g. accountability and public 
participation), and resource efficiency, have become attached to discussions concerning flood 
risk governance. Whilst these represent goals against which µsuccess¶ is socially and 
politically judged, lacking from the literature is a coherent framework to operationalise these 
concepts and evaluate the degree to which these are achieved. Drawing from cross-
disciplinary and cross-country research conducted within the EU project STAR-FLOOD, this 
paper presents a framework for evaluating the extent to which flood risk governance 
arrangements support societal resilience, and demonstrate efficiency and legitimacy. Through 
empirical research in England, this paper critically reflects on the value of this approach in 
terms of identifying entry points to strengthen governance in the pursuit of these goals.      
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1. Introduction  
Amidst a growing consensus that floods will increase in the future (Feyen et al., 2012), flood 
risk governance, through which Flood Risk Management (FRM) is delivered, has emerged as 
a focal point of policy and research attention. In the pursuit of societal resilience, critical 
questions arise about how current governance arrangements support or alternatively constrain 
this goal. Different schools of thought have posited that resilience can be measured in terms 
of the capacity to resist, absorb, recover and/or adapt to stresses and so-FDOOHGµVKRFN¶HYHQWV
(e.g. Folke, 2006; Djalante et al., 2011). These different standpoints naturally have 
implications for how resilience is measured and for identifying necessary characteristics of 
flood risk governance.  
 
Accompanying the pursuit of societal resilience, efficiency discourses have arguably grown in 
momentum following the global financial crisis in 2008 and an increased need to demonstrate 
the best value for public monies (OECD, 2015). However, the redundancy and diversity of 
FRM measures requested for resilience (Hegger et al., 2014), are at odds with this endeavour. 
In addition to resource efficiency, other recurring standards of flood risk governance (and 
µJRRG¶JRYHUQDQFHPRUHEURadly), include transparency, inclusive and participatory decision-
making, accountability, procedural justice, social equity and societal acceptance (Termeer et 
al., 2011; OECD, 2015; Thaler and Hartmann, 2016). These criteria can be assimilated into 
the umbrella notion of legitimacy.  
 
Drawing from public administration and legal research performed within the EU project 
³67$5-)/22'´, this paper critically reviews the concepts of societal resilience, efficiency 
and legitimacy, and seeming conflicts between these. Addressing a neglected gap in the 
literature, this paper presents a framework for evaluating flood risk governance in terms of 
these desired goals. Using English flood risk governance as an empirical example, this paper 
highlights the value of this approach as a tool for identifying entry points to strengthen 
governance in the pursuit of these goals.      
  
 
2. Conceptualising flood risk governance  
Although governance is a disputed concept, there is a consensus that it captures the dynamics 
of governing in the pursuit of a collective goal (Lange et al., 2013). Theoretical debates are 
formed around the different modes of governance, connected to the configuration of actors 
(public authorities, private and civil society), distribution of power and institutional structures 
(Driessen et al., 2012). For some, governance marks a transition from traditional State-led, 
µWRS-GRZQ¶ decision-making, towards increasingly complex actor networks and non-
hierarchical processes (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013; Walker et al., 2014); signifying a shift from 
µgovernment to governance¶Swyngedouw, 2005). However, the impression that governance 
has emerged in a unidirectional fashion is opposed by the argument that hybrid forms of 
governance seem to exist (Shiroyama et al., 2012). Indeed, Bell and Hindmoor (2009) argue 
that whilst the state may have diversified governance strategies, they continue to be a pivotal 
actor. Thus it is possible to discern centralised modes of governance, typifying traditional 
forms of government-led decision-making, alongside other forms of governance (e.g. 
decentralised, public-private, interactive and self-governance; see Driessen et al., 2012).  
 
A key point of contention within governance literature concerns the scales and levels through 
which governance processes occur, and corresponding impact upon the type and scale of 
solutions to environmental problems. For instance, monocentric forms of governance are 
concerned with structural reforms and clarifying responsibilities at different administrative 
levels (Termeer et al., 2010). However, there is mounting evidence to suggest that this 
approach is insufficient to anticipate and respond to uncertainty and complexity of 
contemporary environmental challenges (Renn et al., 2011). This has led to the emergence of 
multi-level governance (Newig and Fritsch, 2008), polycentricity (Ostrom, 1961) and 
adaptive governance (Rijke et al., 2012; Chaffin et al., 2014). Connecting these different 
theoretical positions is the recognition of scale conflicts between administrative levels and the 
scale of environmental problems (OECD, 2015). Building upon these theoretical standpoints, 
this paper acknowledges the importance of multi-level governance and the necessity of 
coordination mechanisms to deliver effective governance. However, features of adaptive 
governance, such as the capacity to transform, are also seen as desirable.  
 
The term flood risk governance denotes a specific form of risk governance, defined by Renn 
HWDOSDVµWKHWUDQVODWLRQRIWKHVXEVWDQFHDQGFRUHSULQFLSOHVRIJRYHUQDQFHWRWKH
context of risk and risk-related decision-PDNLQJ¶ Whilst risk management is delivered 
through ULVNJRYHUQDQFHWKHFRQFHSWH[WHQGVEH\RQGWKLVDQGUHTXLUHVFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIµWKH
complex web of actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms concerned with how 
relevant ULVNLQIRUPDWLRQLVFROOHFWHGDQDO\VHGDQGFRPPXQLFDWHGDQGGHFLVLRQVDUHWDNHQ¶
(Renn et al., 2001; p8). Adopting this line of argumentation, µIORRG¶ LV DWWDFKHG WR WKLV
concept to make explicit the type of risk under study and to delineate this from other forms of 
contemporary risks. A Flood Risk Governance Arrangement (FRGA) can therefore be 
defined as the actor networks, rules, resources, discourses and multi-level coordination 
mechanisms through which FRM is pursued (Alexander et al., 2016). Within this overarching 
arrangement, sub-governance arrangements (sub-FRGAs) are discernible according to 
distinct goals within FRM (e.g. spatial planning aims to minimise exposure, whereas defence 
reduces the likelihood of hazard occurrence). 
 
3. A framework for evaluating flood risk governance  
 (YDOXDWLRQ FDQ EH DSSURDFKHG DV D VHULHV RI µEXLOGLQJ EORFNV¶ WKURXJK ZKLFK LQVLJKWV
obtained from smaller units of analysis inform an understanding of increasingly more 
complex objects (i.e. the overarching FRGA). Thus the proposed framework is designed to be 
flexible and can be tailored accordingly.  
 
Arguably, the biggest challenge is the selection of appropriate evaluation criteria. Although, a 
number of recurring themes are evident within the literature, relating to legitimacy, 
transparency, accountability, fairness, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability (e.g. Rogers 
and Hall, 2002: Lockwood et al., 2010; OECD, 2010; Termeer et al., 2011;); noticeably 
absent is a coherent framework for evaluating risk governance. Ultimately, the selection of 
criteria needs to be informed by the subject matter; therefore the first objective of this 
research was to consult flood risk management policy in the selected countries (Priest et al., 
2013). Although flood risk governance has evolved and functions within different cultural, 
socio-economic, political and cultural settings, a set of shared normative goals exist between 
selected countries (i.e. Netherlands, England, France, Poland, Belgium and Sweden). These 
relate to efforts to enhance societal resilience to flooding, improve efficiency and strengthen 
the legitimacy of flood risk governance; therefore, these form the foundation of the proposed 
framework. It was decided WR H[FOXGH µHIIHFWLYHQHVV¶ as a criterion in its own right (e.g. 
Rogers and Hall, 2002), as this can actually be conceived as a precondition for each 
evaluation criterion and therefore inherently embedded within the evaluation process. For 
example, a flood defence cannot enhance the capacity to resist flooding, unless it is able to 
effectively withstand its design storm. In this sense, the condition of effectiveness can be 
RSHUDWLRQDOLVHGDFFRUGLQJWR<RXQJ¶VGHILQLWLRQRIµJRDODWWDLQPHQW¶.  
 
7RREWDLQDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµWKHZKROH¶LWLVQHFHVVDU\WRVKLIWWKHlocus of evaluation (Box 
1) and reflect on the process, outcome and impact of governance arrangements (Rogers and 
Hall, 2002). Although resilience, efficiency and legitimacy may superficially appear to 
function on different levels, as the reader will observe, the proposed criteria and 
corresponding benchmarks can relate to more than one loci of evaluation; albeit some are 
more closely aligned to some than others (Tables 1-3).  
 
Box 1: Defining different loci of evaluation 
 
Loci of evaluation 
 
Process: The inputs, throughput and outputs of the decision-making process. Inputs may include certain 
resources or stakeholder participation; whereas outputs refer to the result of the decision-making 
process, such as DJUHHPHQW RQ D VSHFLILF FRXUVH RI DFWLRQ µ7KURXJKSXW¶ FDSWXUHV WKH LQWHUQDO
processes and practices connecting inputs to outputs. Rather than isolating these terms (e.g. 
Schmidt, 2013), these are integrated within the WHUP µprocess¶ WR simplify the framework and 
improve usability. For example, one might examine the extent to which citizens participate in the 
process, the nature of public participation (e.g. consultation) and extent to which citizen views 
influence the resulting output.  
 
Outcome:  The implementation of the outputs from the decision-making process, such as the decision to 
erect flood defences or the production of a legal instrument outlining responsibilities for flood 
risk assessment and mapping practices.  
 
Impact:  The resulting effect of the decision-making process and outcome. For example, the extent to 
which the use of flood zones in spatial planning minimises development on the floodplain.  
 
 
 
 3.1 Flood risk governance in the pursuit of societal resilience 
Given the mounting challenges posed by natural hazards, there is a pressing need to µgovern 
IRU UHVLOLHQFH¶ (Djalante et al., 2011). However, as a result of different theoretical 
interpretations of resilience, there are numerous ways in which it might be assessed. In 
response to an ongoing stress or sudden shock, societal resilience can be conceptualised as i) 
a measure of resistance (i.e. ability to block a disruptive event), ii) a measure of return to 
normality (i.e. recovery), iii) a measure of absorption and persistence, or as iv) a measure of 
adaptive capacity (including capabilities to learn and effect change).  
 
The relationship between resistance and resilience is highly contested. For example, de Bruijn 
(2004) argue that whereas resistance strategies act to prevent flooding, resilience strategies 
minimise flood impacts and facilitate recovery. However, the resistance discourse is 
noticeably embedded within the policy discourse of societal resilience in the selected EU 
countries. Acknowledging this, this research conceives the capacity to resist as one facet of 
resilience. 
 
There is growing recognition that floods cannot always be prevented through engineered 
solutions, as defences are not infallible, economically feasible or sustainable long-term 
(Hegger et al., 2014). Therefore, governance should also support the capacity to absorb and 
recover. Diversity in the arrangement of intervention and management measures enables the 
problem to be managed at multiple scales DQG LV VHHQDVDQ LPSRUW µIDLO VDIH¶ 5HQQHWDO
2011; Hegger et al., 2014). The presence of multi-OD\HUHGLQVWLWXWLRQVDOVRDOORZVIRUµVFDOH
matchiQJ¶and to µimprove the fit between knowledge, action, and socio-HFRORJLFDOSURFHVVHV¶ 
(Djalante et al., 2011: p4). 
 
Whilst this facet of resilience appears to be dominant in public policy, this is often criticised 
for neglecting the need to adapt and transform socio-environmental systems. Moreover, 
authors have criticised the lack of criticality about the alignment between resilience and 
neoliberalism ideology. McKinnon and Driscoll Derickson (2012) argue that the concept of 
UHVLOLHQFHµQRUPDOL]HVWKHXQHYHQHIIHFWVRIQHROLEHUDOJRYHUQDQFH¶ and absolves the state of 
accountability (p17).  Similar concerns have been raised in England, where policy discourse 
emphasizes self-reliance at the community scale and essentially shifts responsibility without 
corresponding shifts in power (Penning-Rowsell and Johnson, 2015). Acknowledging this 
valid critique, the framework presented here asserts the importance of performing evaluation 
at multiple scales, recognizing that societal resilience is shaped through multi-level factors. 
 
A third facet of resilience relates to the capacity to adapt (Adger et al., 2005). Attached to 
this, social and institutional learning, alongside opportunities to innovate and experiment are 
seen as important features of governance (Duit et al., 2010; Djalante et al., 2011; Termeer et 
al., 2011). Adaptive governance is often conceptualized as the capability to self-organize, 
adjust and transform processes and structures in response to changing social-ecological 
systems (Djalante et al., 2011; Rijke et al., 2012). Systematic and iterative learning processes 
are fundamental for this (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013), as well as flexible rule structures (e.g. soft 
law) to accommodate uncertainty (Termeer et al., 2011). Synthesising this discussion, Table 1 
identifies benchmarks of successful governance if it is to support societal resilience to 
flooding.  
 
Table 1: Benchmarks for determining the extent to which flood risk governance supports 
societal resilience 
 Evaluation 
criteria 
Benchmarks of success  Dominant locus of 
evaluation 
Capacity to 
resist 
 The assembly of measures/projects/or governance arrangements is 
shown to have enhanced the capacity of the social-environmental 
system to reduce the likelihood and/or magnitude of flood hazard 
 
Outcome  
Impact 
Capacity to 
absorb and 
recover 
 Diversity of measures/projects/or FRM strategies to address risk in a 
holistic way (i.e. from the likelihood of occurrence (resistance) to 
the potential range of consequences) 
Outcome 
 
 
 Bridging mechanisms exist which support integration and 
coordination between different levels of governance and sub-
governance arrangements   
Process 
 
 Use of measures/projects/FRM strategies is multi-layered to address 
risk at different spatial and temporal scales 
Outcome 
 The assembly of measures/projects/or governance arrangements is 
shown to have enhanced the resilience of the social-environmental 
system in terms of reducing the consequences, enabling the system 
to absorb and/or quickly recover 
Outcome 
Impact 
Capacity to 
adapt* 
 
 2SSRUWXQLWLHV IRU OHDUQLQJ DQG HYLGHQFH WKDW µOHVVRQV OHDUQHG¶ DUH
implemented 
Process 
Outcome 
 Opportunities are created for innovation and experimentation  Process 
Outcome 
 The legal framework or legal instruments / plans and programmes 
are subject to periodic review proceedings in order to incorporate 
new information about climate change and floods 
Process 
Outcome 
 There is a balance between adequate flexibility in the legal 
framework in order to allow adjustments and legal certainty 
Process 
 Evidence that future risks and uncertainty (e.g. climate change) are 
factored into the decision-making process  
Process 
Outcome 
Impact 
* There are clear difficulties in demonstrating µLPSDFW¶ZKHQHYDOXDWLQJWKHFDSDFLW\WRDGDSW, which, given its 
underlying principles of learning and improvement, manifest in improved capacities to resist, absorb and 
recover in the(unbounded)  future.  
 
 
3.2 Flood risk governance in the pursuit of resource efficiency  
Efficiency is a recurring criterion in evaluations of environmental governance (OECD, 2015). 
Efficient flood risk governance is politically and socially desirable, especially as FRM is 
largely funded by public money. This is seen as necessary for delivering sustainable FRM, as 
emphasised in national and European policy (e.g. Defra/EA, 2011). The concept of efficiency 
can be applied to a range of resources, including economic, human (e.g. knowledge, skills 
and personnel) and technological (e.g. flood risk modelling and mapping).  
 
Concerns for efficiency are often evidence by established methods for determining resource 
allocation, such as Cost-Benefit Analysis where the feasibility of defence measures are 
weighed against alternatives (Hanley and Black, 2006). Other benchmarks may include 
attempts to diversify funding sources and burden-sharing arrangements, such as public-
private partnerships. However, efforts to secure the efficient use of financial resources should 
be assessed over short to long-term timescales, if the availability and sustainability of 
finances is to be guaranteed (OECD, 2015). Measures for other types of resources may 
include Mutual Aid Agreements (for sharing personnel) and statutory duties for flood risk 
professionals to cooperate and share information. As discussed by Termeer et al. (2010) 
transaction costs can escalate within multi-level governance arrangements, thus strategies for 
minimising these are required.  
 
 (IILFLHQF\PD\DSSHDU WR FRQIOLFWZLWK WKHQRWLRQRI µEDFN-XSV¶ DQG UHGXQGDQF\ DGYRFDWHG
for resilience. This is in fact a complex relationship, dependent on how costs are dispersed 
across different potential funding sources (e.g. public, private sector). Furthermore, the most 
efficient use of resources may leave no reserve to deploy when shock events occur, or may 
even dissuade long-term adaptations. However, it is clear from policy analysis performed as 
part of this research, that resilience and efficiency are not of equal importance in FRM policy 
(i.e. resilience-goals are regarded as superior to efficiency-goals).  
 
Table 2: Benchmarks for determining the extent to which flood risk governance can be 
described as efficient  
Evaluation 
criteria 
Benchmarks for efficient flood risk governance 
  
Dominant locus 
of evaluation 
Resource 
efficiency  
 
(Including 
economic, 
human 
(personnel, skills 
and knowledge) 
and 
technological 
resources) 
 The flood risk governance arrangement or sub-entities of 
governance (e.g. FRM measures, projects or sub-arrangements) use 
resources in an efficient manner, based on the ratio of desired 
output(s) to input(s) 
Process 
Outcome 
 Concerns for resource efficiency are widely evident within the 
flood risk governance arrangement (and delivered activities), as 
well as within the legal framework and/or are taken into account in 
amendments and reforms  
Process 
 
 FRM measures deliver multiple benefits, for example economic, 
social and / or environmental benefits or address multiple problems 
(thus reducing the need for multiple schemes/projects at added cost) 
Process 
Outcome 
Impact 
 The legal and institutional framework favour good cooperation 
between the different actors involved in FRM (ensuring timely 
exchange of information and minimising the overlap of tasks 
completed by different actors) 
Process 
 Resource efficiency is allied to goals of sustainable FRM (thus 
demonstrating concerns with long-term efficiency) (e.g. evidence of 
short- to long-term financial planning) 
Process  
 The legal framework, the overall process of decision-making and 
delivered-activities are described as efficient by relevant actors and 
stakeholders 
Outcome 
 
 
3.3 Flood risk governance in the pursuit of legitimacy 
/HJLWLPDF\LVZLGHO\FLWHGDVHVVHQWLDOIRUµJRRGJRYHUQDQFH¶81'32(&'
Allied concepts of transparency, accountability, procedural justice, fairness and social equity, 
inclusiveness, public participation and acceptance are either distinguished from (e.g. 
Lockwood et al., 2010) or enveloped within the concept of legitimacy (e.g. Termeer et al., 
2011). In part, this conceptual confusion reflects different disciplinary perspectives, through 
political theory, philosophy, law and public administration. Complicating matters further, the 
shift in emphasis between input, throughput and output legitimacy manifest in different 
evaluation criteria (Lindgren and Persson, 2010; Schmidt, 2013). For instance, input 
legitimacy may be measured in terms of participatory quality, whereas output legitimacy 
refers to the judgement of the resulting outcomes (e.g. added value; Scharpf, 1999). 
Connecting these, throughput legitimacy focuses on the efficacy, accountability, transparency, 
inclusiveness and openness of governance processes (Schmidt, 2013). In the absence of an 
agreed set of legitimacy criteria, this research focuses on the recurrent and most pertinent 
criteria (Table 3).  
 
Accountability is a prominent feature of governance discourse. However, the emergence of 
multi-level governance and diversified actors networks necessitates a broader approach to 
accountability assessments, beyond the traditional focus on democratic legitimacy, to include 
 other indicators whereby non-state actors are held accountable (e.g. public inquiries, media 
µWULDOV¶). Evaluations of accountability should examine the means and process through which 
involved actors are held responsible for their output decisions (Schmidt, 2013). A prerequisite 
for accountability is the transparency of the process and outcome (Ahrens and Rudolph, 
2006). Related to this, citizens must have access to information. These conditions are 
reinforced through EU and domestic policies and law (e.g. Aarhus Convention 1998, EU 
2001).  
 
Ultimately, governance arrangements should enable citizens to articulate their interests and 
exercise their legal rights (UNDP, 1997). This can be framed in terms of procedural justice 
and understood as the fairness of decision-making processes, as well as the ability to 
challenge decisions that have been made (Johnson et al., 2007). According to Hendriks 
(2014), procedural justice is a core value of good governance, related to several process 
values such as lawfulness, transparency, accountability and equality of rights. Similarly, 
Bowers and Robinson (2012) emphasise the importance of neutrality, accuracy, consistency, 
transparency, trustworthiness and fairness as key criteria for procedural legitimacy.  
 
Fairness, equity and distributive justice are often aligned to legitimacy debates (Shiroyama et 
al., 2012; Gross-Camp et al., 2012; OECD, 2015). Here, distributive justice refers to the 
extent to which the outcomes of decision-making processes can be considered to be fair 
(rather than necessarily equal). Flood risk management is presented with a range of justice 
dilemmas, such as the allocation of resources and whether or how to differentiate standards of 
flood protection. Addressing these dilemmas, Thaler and Hartmann (2016) identify how 
different concepts of justice (utilitarian, libertarian and egalitarian) manifest in different FRM 
approaches. Thus what is deemed to be socially equitable will vary accordingly. Recognising 
the importance of culturally-sensitive and context-based evaluation, the evaluation 
framework does not impose a normative position on this matter; although researchers are 
encouraged to critically reflect on this. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the decision to 
embed social equity within the umbrella of legitimacy is in itself a normative stance and one 
similarly adopted by others (e.g. Termeer et al., 2011).  
 
Another prevalent criterion is public participation, which is often seen as a means of 
addressing distrust and lack of confidence in formal institutions (EC, 2001), as well as 
democratising governance (Bulkeley and Mol, 2003). Assessments of participation should 
consider the quality of the process, when and how it is undertaken, and the access and 
representation of certain groups. Increased participation is widely regarded as better for 
multiple reasons (i.e. increased democracy, improved quality of outputs, procedural fairness 
and facilitating acceptance of decision-making; Hartmann and Spit, 2016). However, there is 
a need acknowledge that there may be justifications to limit stakeholder involvement (e.g. 
situations requiring certified expertise) or instances where representative authorities and 
accountable institutions (legitimised via the political system), can determine appropriate 
actions (Hartmann and Spit, 2016). Moreover, the quality of participation should be 
considered. Indeed, participation is not a guarantee of fairness, but could reinforce the 
interests of already powerful groups. Nonetheless, participation is often framed as a crucial 
pathway for achieving output legitimacy, whereby the outputs of decision-making are 
deemed by society as acceptable (Newig and Fritsch, 2008; Lockwood et al., 2010; Schmidt, 
2013).  
 
A final point to note, is that there DUHLPSRUWDQWGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQµRXWSXWOHJLWLPDF\¶DQG
how output is defined with process-based evaluations of governance (Box 1). Whereas the 
 latter is simply concerned with the result of input and throughput (e.g. a specific decision 
about flood safety standards), output legitimacy is akin to our conceptualisation of outcome-
based evaluation and focuses on the implementation of this result (e.g. is it perceived to be 
fair?). Indeed, if a decision is reached, yet never implemented, then the need for evaluation is 
arguably redundant. For this reason, the framework presented in this paper uses the term 
µRXWFRPH¶ LQ DQ DWWHPSW WR FODULI\ WKLV FRQFHSWXDO FRQIXVLRQ DV ZHOO DV LQWURGXFLQJ DQ
extension to evaluation whereby the impact of outcomes are critically analysed.  
 
Table 3: Benchmarks for determining the extent to which flood risk governance can be 
described as legitimate 
 
Evaluation 
criteria 
Benchmarks for legitimate flood risk governance 
 
Dominant locus 
of evaluation 
Social equity 
 
 The distribution of costs and benefits are fully considered within 
the decision-making process and communicated to those affected 
Process 
 The process and outcome of the decision-making is perceived to be 
fair 
Outcome 
Impact 
Accountability 
 
 There are opportunities for stakeholders to challenge decisions that 
have been made and hold the diversity of actors involved to 
account 
Process 
Outcome 
Transparency 
 
 The decision-making process is transparent so all can see how 
decisions were made (e.g. public inquiries)  
Process 
Outcome 
Participation 
 
 Stakeholder participation has been sought through various stages in 
the decision-making process, based on a model of knowledge 
exchange  
Process 
 A range of stakeholders have been involved in stakeholder 
participation (inclusiveness) 
Process 
 The views of stakeholders have been considered and integrated 
within decision-making 
Outcome 
Impact 
Access to 
information 
 Stakeholders have equal access to relevant information about the 
problem and how it will be managed 
Process 
Procedural justice 
 
 There are opportunities for stakeholders to challenge decisions that 
have been made 
Process 
 Stakeholder have equal access to the appeal process Process 
 The process of resolving disputes is considered to be fair Outcome 
Acceptability 
 
 The processes involved in decision-making are accepted by 
stakeholders 
Outcome 
 Decisions are accepted by stakeholders Outcome 
Impact 
 
 
4. Methods for application   
To validate this evaluation framework, empirical research was conducted in England. A range 
of data were consulted, including national policy (e.g. Defra/EA, 2011; Defra, 2012a), 
legislation, spending figures (e.g. Defra, 2014a), as well as independent and public inquiries 
(e.g. Pitt, 2008; Efra committee, 2015). This was accompanied by over sixty semi-structured 
interviews with past and current flood risk professionals to capture a range of perspectives, 
from policy to practice, situated at national to local scales. Three case studies were selected 
for further in-depth study to facilitate understanding of how national governance 
arrangements influence local FRM (Table 4). Interviewees were asked to reflect on their 
specific area of expertise and consider the current strengths, weaknesses and constraining 
factors limiting the success of FRM in terms of societal resilience, efficiency and legitimacy. 
These interviews were then subject to thematic analysis and systematic coding (Fereday and 
Muir-Cochrane, 2008). These results were then theoretically combined with the findings from 
desk-based analysis to construct a holistic evaluation of flood risk governance in England.  
  
Table 4: Case studies for evaluating flood risk governance at the local scale 
 
Case study Rationale 
Kingston-upon-Hull, 
Yorkshire, NE England  
 
Several Flood Alleviation Schemes (based on flood storage) are at various stages 
of design, consultation and construction; the most of advanced of which is the 
Willerby and Derringham Flood Alleviation Scheme (WADFAS) and partly 
funded by the European Regional Development Fund.  
 
River Thames Scheme, 
Lower Thames, SE 
England 
The River Thames Scheme (RTS) is an example where a range of FRM measures 
are being considered at different spatial scales, including alleviation channels, 
dredging, increased flow capacity via weir amendments as well as property-level 
measures. An additional £50m must still be sourced at the local scale.  
 
City of Leeds, Yorkshire, 
NE England 
The Leeds city centre River Aire Flood Alleviation Scheme (RAFAS) represents 
an innovative project and will be the first time moveable weirs will have been 
installed in England to reduce flood risk. The scheme has received funding from 
'HIUD¶V*URZWK)XQGDVZHOO as the Regional Growth Fund administered by the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. 
 
 
Drawing form the comprehensive evaluation of English flood risk governance presented in 
Alexander et al. (2016), Table 5 presents some selected examples. The distinction is made 
between the features that were found (to varying degrees) to support or constrain resilience, 
efficiency and legitimacy. Therefore, the table should not be viewed in binary terms nor 
interpreted as equally-weighted (Alexander et al., 2016). Due to practical constraints, the 
following discussion focuses on a sub-set of these results in relation to a sub-FRGA for 
fluvial and coastal flood defence and mitigation. This includes a range of measures which are 
employed to minimise the likelihood and magnitude of flooding, by resisting (e.g. 
embankments) or accommodating (e.g. flood storage areas) water, respectively (Hegger et al., 
2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5: Evaluating flood risk governance: Selected examples from England (based on Alexander et al., 2016) 
 
 Evaluation 
criteria 
Supportive features of flood risk governance Constraining features of flood risk governance 
R
ES
IL
IE
N
C
E 
Capacity to 
resist flooding 
 
- 6 year capital commitment of £2.3bn outlined in the 
National Investment Plan (Defra, 2014a); 
- Introduction of Partnership Funding means all defence 
schemes are now eligible for some funding; 
 
- Challenge of securing funding outside of public sector means some defence 
schemes are unable to begin construction; 
- Revenue (maintenance) is allocated annually and lacks the security of the 6 year 
investment programme new projects; although this budget was recently 
projected until 2021 (HM Treasury, 2015); 
Capacity to 
absorb and 
recover 
 
- Highly effective institutional arrangements for emergency 
management; 
- High penetration of insurance to facilitate financial recovery 
from floods. 
- Efforts to encourage citizen involvement in FRM can be slow to take effect (due 
to risk perception, sustaining interest post-flood, access to resources); 
- Forecasting capabilities for surface water warning are less developed. 
 
Capacity to 
adapt 
 
- The transition towards risk-reflective pricing in insurance 
under the Flood Re scheme could incentivise adaptive 
reinstatement; 
- Catchment Flood Management Plans support strategic 
decision-making over a 50 to 100 year timescale;  
- Lack of incentives to incorporate adaptation within spatial planning for new and 
existing developments in areas at risk of flooding; 
- Capped flood insurance within Flood Re could override the financial incentive 
for homeowners to reduce their own risk and it remains unclear how property-
level resilience measures (once installed) will be rewarded by insurers;  
EF
FI
C
IE
N
C
Y
 Resource 
efficiency 
 
- Allocation of capital and revenue spending determined by 
cost-benefit analysis, whole-life costing and risk-based 
prioritisation; 
- Duties for cooperation, sharing information and 
coordinating activities are legal established (e.g. Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004 / Regulations 2005). 
- The potential for Catchment-Based Approaches (CaBA) whereby flood 
alleviation schemes deliver multiple benefits (e.g. environmental, recreational 
etc.) is constrained by absence of methods for performing cross-sectoral cost-
benefit analysis. Moreover, further research is needed to demonstrate that CaBA 
can significantly reduce the likelihood of flooding (POSTNOTE, 2014). 
LE
G
IT
IM
A
C
Y
 
Social equity 
 
- Partnership Funding enables Grant-in-Aid to be allocated 
across a wider range of smaller projects, as opposed to a 
few high-value projects; thus in theory at-risk communities 
have an equal opportunity of implementing schemes; 
- Deprivation is factored into the funding calculator; 
- Evidence to suggest that achieving Partnership Funding may be easier in some 
communities, particularly those with high social capital, than others; 
- Socially perceived inequalities emerged in the Winter 2015/16 floods and 
perceived north-south divide in defence spending; 
 
Accountability 
 
- Post-event inquiries hold relevant actors accountable; 
- A range of legal proceedings can be initiated to challenge 
decision-making and hold public bodies to account. 
- Lack of a systematic (proactive as opposed to reactive) approach for reviewing, 
assessing and challenging FRM practice and governance.  
 
Transparency 
 
- All governmental bodies are subject to public scrutiny; 
- Local scrutiny boards are also established under the Flood 
and Water Management Act 2010 to evaluate local FRM 
strategies. 
- Some defence schemes have received allocation of funding outside the national 
procedure for Partnership Funding, with little explanation; 
- A potential drawback of the µVFUXWLQLVLQJFXOWXUH¶LVWKHWHQGHQF\WRunfairly 
attribute blame.  
  
 Evaluation 
criteria 
- Supportive features of flood risk governance - Constraining features of flood risk governance 
LE
G
IT
IM
A
C
Y
 
Participation 
 
- Citizen engagement is highly embedded within English 
flood risk governance, with widespread examples of success 
(e.g. Defra Pathfinder projects; Defra, 2012b); 
- Statutory duties to consult the public (e.g. Flood Risk 
Regulations 2009, Flood and Water Management Act 2010). 
 
- Sustaining and motivating community interest can prove challenging post-flood 
and risk perception dwindles; 
- Resource constraints limit the roles of community engagement officers within 
the Environment Agency and Local Authorities.   
 
Access to 
information 
 
- Flood risk information is publically available (e.g. 
Community Risk Registers, national flood risk mapping). 
- According to the National Audit Office (2014) local communities appear to lack 
information about how defence maintenance is being de-prioritised in some 
areas and implications for flood risk.  
Procedural 
justice 
 
- With Partnership Funding, at-risk communities have an 
equal opportunity of implementing schemes, provided that 
local sources of funding are secured;  
- In spatial planning, development (including development on 
the floodplain) continues to be assessed within a nationally 
consistent decision-making framework. 
- With regards to flood insurance, the cross-subsidisation of flood risks between 
areas of high and low risks raises questions about whether it is fair for those at 
lower risks to be effectively paying for those in high risk areas. This is made 
more explicit under the new Flood Re system ± at least until the scheme 
transitions towards risk-reflective pricing. 
Acceptability 
 
- Public consultation and participation methods are widely 
used to facilitate understanding and acceptance of FRM 
schemes. 
 
- Societal expectation that the State should prevent floods from occurring and 
limited awareness of permissive responsibilities or understanding of risk 
management authorities. 3ROLWLFDOµNQHHMHUN¶UHDFWLRQV (e.g. 2013/14 and 
2015/16 winter floods) reinforce this view.   
 
 
  
5. Evaluating fluvial and coastal flood defence and mitigation governance in England  
To demonstrate the application of the evaluation framework, this section examines fluvial 
and coastal flood defence and mitigation governance in England (for a more detailed account 
the reader is referred to Alexander et al., 2016).  
 
5.1 Evaluating the contribution to societal resilience  
(QJODQG¶V capacity to resist flooding has been reinforced by a six year spending programme, 
which commits £2.3bn towards 1,400 defence and mitigation schemes to offer a 5% 
reduction in flood risk by 2021 (Defra, 2014a). Moreover, existing lines of defences have 
proven to be highly effective in recent years (Environment Agency, 2014). However, the 
Winter 2015/16 floods highlighted some weaknesses in the current system when faced with 
extreme flood events. Recognising that such events may become more frequent in the future, 
the UK Government has since launched a National Flood Resilience Review to examine how 
England might be better prepared for flooding (Defra et al., 2016).  
 
A focal point of this review concerns the current and future investment strategy for flood 
defence and mitigation. This follows previous scrutiny of capital and revenue budgets for 
funding new projects and asset maintenance, respectively. In the aftermath of the Winter 
2013/14 floods, the National Audit Office (2014) reported that the total funding for flood 
defence maintenance decreased by 10% in real terms between 2010-11 and 2014-15. The 
perceived shortfall in revenue for maintenance work and decision to allocate this on an 
annual basis was a recurring criticism voiced by flood risk professionals. Since the time of 
data collection this budget has now been protected until 2021 (HM Treasury, 2015). Whilst 
this is an important step-forward in securing revenue in the medium-term, a continuation or 
extension of this spending programme is needed to enhance capacities to resist flooding in the 
longer-term.  
 
An important step-change in policy has been the implementation of Partnership Funding in 
2012 (Defra, 2012a). Under this new scheme, Grant-in-Aid available through the Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) must be supported by locally-sourced 
funding, via Local Authorities, the private sector and/or civil society. In terms of capacities to 
resist, this approach enables more flood defence schemes to be developed than the previous 
system which favoured high-priority schemes (Defra, 2014b).  
 
³[It]  creates a kind of hybrid system where there is still the backbone of 
national funding and national prioritisation«but a sense that local input 
and local funding can add to, increase the scale of the scheme and help to 
influence the time of projects, the nature of projects, so that you have both 
national and local priorities being delivered together. The consequences of 
that, is that about 25% more schemes are being delivered than if funding 
was left to national government´ (former National-level policymaker) 
 
However, concerns have also been expressed about the difficulties of securing additional 
funds at the local scale. The River Thames Scheme 576 LVDJRRGH[DPSOHRI WKLV³The 
challenge « with our finances being more and more squeezed is how do we find that local 
FRQWULEXWLRQ«7KHUHLVDGDQJHUWKDWZHPLJKWQRWEHDEOHWRGHOLYHr the full programme of 
schemes´ (Local Authority, RTS). Thus in practice, the success of Partnership Funding is 
challenged by a range of factors. To date, Partnership Funding has largely been delivered 
through the redistribution and diversification of public sector sources, with ca. 25% of 
 financial contributions between April 2011 and March 2015 of private sector origin (NAO, 
2014). The need to reduce dependency on state money was an expressed concern, e.g. 
³Something like 70% of matched funding that EA has received so far has come from other 
areas of government, but as public funding is cut, those options will diminish´
(Environmental NGO). Moreover, the success of attracting private investors has been 
questioned, especially as only £40m of the £148m secured to date has come from sources 
beyond local government (Efra committee, 2015).  
 
Nonetheless, Partnership Funding has successfully helped to diversify funding sources, 
reduce dependency of Grant-in-$LGDQGKHOSHGWRµXQORFN¶VFKHPHVSUHYLRXVO\DWDVWDQGVWLOO
This is particularly evident in the Leeds case study and the River Aire Flood Alleviation 
Scheme (RAFAS), which, when aligned to the economic growth agenda, was able to secure 
funding through Growth Fund monies available from the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills and Defra. The delivery of multiple benefits is seen by many 
interviewed as an important means of diversifying funding sources for FRM. Although this 
could be enhanced further through more integrated catchment-based approaches, a key 
constraint to this is the lack of methods for performing cross-sectoral cost-benefit analysis. 
This is something that warrants further research.   
 
Although the capacity to absorb and recover predominantly concerns other aspects of flood 
risk governance (Table 5), there are some aspects of defence/mitigation governance that are 
relevant. In particular, the use of demountable flood defences and property level measures 
play an important role in lessening the impact of flood events. Triggered by the Winter 
2015/16 floods, the government also launched a Household Flood Resilience Grant Scheme 
to provide grants up to £5000 to help adapt affected properties (Priestley, 2016). Indeed, the 
use of different types of measures, employed at multiple scales, is a considerable strength of 
the English system. However, there were also expressed reservations about the political knee-
jerk reactions that followed the Winter 2013/14 floods. Of relevance to the evaluation of 
resilience, several interviewees commented that WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHDFWLRQ could instil the 
impression that the State will intervene and make funds available to either prevent flooding 
through large-scale defence schemes or assist with financial recovery. Perversely, this could 
discourage householders from taking steps to proactively manage their own risk. It is clear 
that consistent communication messages are required with regards to flood risk, management 
decisions and the distribution of responsibilities.  
 
With respect to adaptive capacity, the application of managed adaptive approaches in large-
scale schemes (e.g. RAFAS) instils a degree of flexibility to adjust responses to suit changing 
conditions. Climate-change concerns are also factored into Catchment Flood Management 
Plans, which support strategic decision-making over a 50 to 100 year timescale. In addition to 
forward-planning, there is also an established culture of institutional learning. An example of 
this, are the independent and public inquiries which have become common practice (e.g. Pitt, 
2008).  
 
5.2 Evaluating resource efficiency 
The National Investment Plan was universally regarded by those interviewed as a necessary 
step in allocating resources for defence measures in the medium-term. This approach 
provides a degree of much needed certainty to enable Risk Management Authorities to 
µSDFNDJH¶SURMHFWVDQGVRXUFHFRPSHWLWLYHSULFHVIURPVXSSOLHUVASC, 2014). Moreover, it is 
anticipated that the efficiency savings made will be reinvested in defence and mitigation 
 projects (Defra, 2014b); thus providing a positive feedback into efforts to enhance the 
capacity to resist flooding.  
 
However, a negative feedback loop also exists in relation to Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), 
from which the allocation of capital and revenue spending, the type of measure(s) and 
standard of protection, are determined. On one hand, CBA provides a means of allocating 
stretched financial resources on a priority-basis. On the other, it means that schemes cannot 
be approved for funding until a favourable cost-benefit ratio is obtained (i.e. £8 benefit 
achieved for every £1 of government-spend), which can prove difficult for certain areas to 
achieve. For example, in the Kingston-upon-Hull case study, professionals commented on the 
QDWXUHRISRWHQWLDO IXQGLQJSDUWQHUV³in this area our partners are developers, agriculture, 
inward investors ... [but] the partnership funding rules do not favour development, 
agriculture and inward investment´ /RFDO $XWKRULW\). Furthermore, the Leeds case study 
provides an example where achieving the 8:1 ratio meant the need to downscale the standard 
of protection of the scheme and therefore highlights the trade-offs that are made between the 
pursuit of resilience and resource efficiency.   
 
5.3 Evaluating legitimacy 
A deprivation bias is embedded within the FRM funding calculator in an attempt to deliver a 
more socially equitable approach (Defra, 2012a). This bias recognises that deprived areas are 
³least likely to be able to contribute towards the cost of a flood defence scheme and less able 
to recover after a flood without additional support from the state´ (former National-level 
policymaker). This reflects a shift in principles of social justice underlying the allocation and 
distribution of resources. Whereas the past was characterised by strong utilitarianism, with 
WD[SD\HUV¶PRQH\GLUHFWHGWRZDUGVVFKHPHVWKDWPD[LPLVHGHFRQRPLFHIILFLHQF\, this is now 
complemented by egalitarian principles (Thaler and Hartmann, 2016).    
 
Although this is a positive feature of governance, perceptions of inequalities are equally 
important in determining the acceptability of FRM decision-making. In particular, the   
Winter 2013/14 floods seemed to instil the impression that µWKRVHZKRVKRXWWKHORXGHVW¶ are 
able to assert their demands through political networks and the media. A representative from 
an Environmental NGO remarked ³large floods do become political footballs...why did 150 
KRPHVLQ6RPHUVHWJHWDOOWKDWPRQH\DQGDWWHQWLRQDQGLQWKHQRUWKRI(QJODQGGLGQ¶W´ 
(Environmental NGO). In the case of the Somerset Levels this resulted in £10m funding from 
central Government for dredging and repair work, without a formal cost-benefit analysis and 
irrespective of expert advice (NAO, 2014). These observations reveal the importance of 
transparency and accessibility to information about funding allocations. In theory, Partnership 
Funding supports procedural justice as all schemes are eligible, providing additional sources 
of funding are secured; however, examples such as this appear to support the impression that 
this is easier in some communities than others.  
 
In terms of access to information, all flood risk information is publically available (e.g. 
Community Risk Registers, national flood risk mapping etc.). There are also statutory duties 
to consult the public (e.g. Flood Risk Regulations 2009) and requirements in policy for Risk 
0DQDJHPHQW$XWKRULWLHVµWRZRUNLQSDUWQHUVKLSZLWKFRPPXQLWLHV¶ (Defra/EA, 2011). Public 
participation is highly embedded within governance, with widespread examples of good 
practice (e.g. Defra, 2012b). There is also evidence of a range of engagement methods being 
deployed. For example, public exhibitions were used to demonstrate the flood modelling 
underscoring the flood alleviation scheme in the Hull case study and facilitate dialogue at the 
public-professional interface.  
  
Frequent reviews by Parliamentary Committees, the National Audit Office and independent 
inquiries (e.g. Pitt, 2008) also help to enhance transparency and accountability, as well as 
promoting opportunities for learning. Although caution should be exercised to ensure that this 
GRHVQRWFUHDWHD µVFUXWLQLVLQJFXOWXUH¶ WKDWXQIDLUO\DWWULEXWHVEODPH, something which was 
widely observed in discussions relating to the Winter 2013/14 floods.   
 
5.4 Recommendations for strengthening governance  
This evaluation highlights multiple pathways through which societal resilience, efficiency 
and legitimacy are delivered, as well as identifying useful entry points for strengthening 
governance. From these insights the following recommendations are made; 
 
 There needs to be a continuation or extension of the current spending programme 
once the current Investment Plan is delivered in 2021, which gives equal 
consideration to capital and revenue funding from the outset. This will ensure that 
capacities to resist flooding are supported in the medium-term. 
 Realising the potential of Partnership Funding and reducing dependency on public 
monies, requires a strategy to promote private sector contributions, based on further 
research to understand motivations and incentive mechanisms; 
 There is a need to better manage societal expectations about FRM to enhance 
acceptance of risk-EDVHGµOLYLQJZLWKZDWHU¶SKLORVRSK\DQGHPSRZHULQGLYLGXDOVWR
adopt adaptive behaviours (e.g. implementation of property-level measures). This 
requires open and honest public engagement, investment in supportive mechanisms 
and consistent communication.   
 
 
6. Conclusions  
This paper presents a coherent framework for evaluating flood risk governance in the pursuit 
of societal resilience, efficiency and legitimacy. Through empirical research conducted in 
England, the applicability and value of this framework as a tool for identifying strengths and 
weaknesses of current governance arrangements, is demonstrated. This research not only 
addresses a neglected gap in the study of flood risk governance, but provides an evaluative 
approach that can be applied to different spatial and temporal scales of study. Moreover, 
where similar normative standards exist, this framework could serve as an important means 
of facilitating cross-country comparisons, from which transferable lessons could be identified.  
 
Further research is needed to document the potential shifts in importance of selected criteria 
and resilience, efficiency and legitimacy goals. Such differences may manifest: i) across sub-
arrangements of flood risk governance (e.g. spatial planning, flood insurance etc.); ii) where 
modes of governance vary (centralised, public-private etc.); iii) across time; and iv) between 
countries with differing socio-cultural norms and values. Such research could lead to more 
nuanced benchmarks for success. Beyond flood risk governance, further research to explore 
the potential applicability to other types of natural hazards is warranted. Nonetheless, the 
evaluation framework provides a robust and comprehensive tool that can be appropriately 
tailored to suit these future research needs, as well as providing a necessary first step in 
assessing, monitoring and strengthening flood risk governance.  
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